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# INTEGRATION AND DISARMAMENT PROGRAMME STRATEGY

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## ACRONYMS

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<b>AMC</b>	Armoury Management Course
<b>CM</b>	Change Management
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisations
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
<b>DSC</b>	Disarmament Steering Committee
<b>GNC</b>	General National Congress
<b>HR</b>	Human Rights
<b>I&amp;D</b>	Integration & Disarmament
<b>IHL</b>	International Humanitarian Law
<b>ISACS</b>	International Small Arms Control Standards
<b>JAC</b>	Joint Appeals Committee
<b>JWCO</b>	Joint Weapons Control Office
<b>LPRD</b>	Libyan Programme for Reintegration and Development
<b>LTi</b>	Libya Transition Initiative
<b>MOD</b>	Ministry of Defence
<b>MOE</b>	Ministry of Education
<b>MOR</b>	Management of Risk
<b>NTC</b>	National Transitional Council
<b>OTI</b>	Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)
<b>PM</b>	Project Management
<b>RDD</b>	Reintegration, Demobilisation & Disarmament
<b>SALW</b>	Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>SHC</b>	Security High Committee
<b>SME</b>	Small and Medium Enterprises
<b>SOP</b>	Standing Operating Procedures
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>Thaerat</b>	Libyan Revolutionary Forces (Female)
<b>Thuwar</b>	Libyan Revolutionary Forces (Male)
<b>TI</b>	Transition International
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>WAC</b>	Warriors Affairs Commission
<b>WCS</b>	Weapons Control Systems/Strategy

## 1. INTRODUCTION

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In February 2011, the regime of Muammar Gaddafi met popular protests in Eastern Libya with brutal violence, which led to the revolution that ultimately brought his 42-year reign to an end. The representatives of the National Transitional Council (NTC), which was to steer Libya's transition to democracy, developed a road map that lays out constitutional and electoral processes. Alongside these efforts, new political freedoms have ushered in emerging civil society organisations and independent media outlets working to promote the spirit of change in Libya. However, the transition from dictatorship to democracy has proven to be full of challenges, among which the reintegration of those who picked up arms, and those who were released from prisons, during the revolution are a priority.

The Warriors Affairs Commission (WAC) was established on the 29th October 2011 by a resolution of the President of the Executive Office, Certification by the National Transitional Council (NTC) and the Transitional Government. The WAC was mandated to register, rehabilitate and reintegrate "those who fought in the front lines, defended cities and political prisoners" into formal state institutions, private-sector enterprises or education, thus giving them opportunities to contribute to the renaissance and development of Libya, for which they fought. WAC produced impressive initial results including the establishment of a professional data-base of 165,000 former Thuwar, all vetted through interviews and against brigade listings. As a result, nine reintegration projects in four programme areas, namely political, economic, social and educational reintegration, have been established under WAC.

Three years after WAC was established, under Cabinet Decision No. (888) 2013, it was transformed into the Libyan Programme for Reintegration and Development (LPRD). According to the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. (888) 2013: *Reorganizing the Warriors Affairs Commission* [into the Libyan Programme for Reintegration and Development - LPRD], Article 4: "The Programme is considered one phase among the phases of Thuwar reintegration, rehabilitation and development, through the relevant authorities, and in particular it may:

- Act to Reintegrate Thuwar by employment in the different areas of the Libyan Public and Private sectors.
- Act in Coordination with the relevant authorities, to provide financing opportunities of Small and Medium Enterprises.
- Monitor conducting of Training, Educational and Vocational Programmes inside and outside the country, in preparation for reintegration.
- Propose legislation and regulations necessary for reintegration.
- Make the required proposals, in coordination with the relevant authorities, to disarm the Thuwar who have not been delegated for study and training, and integrating them such that disarmament is a prime prerequisite.

In order for the Programme to achieve its goals it may:

- Join Partnerships with funds and national entities competent to finance Small and Medium Enterprises (SME).

- Enter into contracts with National and Foreign organisations to train and develop the Thuwar.
- Enter into contracts and cooperate with supporting National and Foreign organisations and entities desiring to assist in the Programme's Projects.
- Own and lease real estate and all means to achieve its objectives.
- Enter into agreements with banks to obtain the required facilities to achieve its objectives.
- Invest resources to realise additional revenues.”<sup>1</sup>

The LPRDs vision is that *“former Thuwar contribute to the rebuilding and prosperity of Libya”*. To facilitate this, LPRD has established five programmes, each including several projects:

- Economic Reintegration Programme (Small and medium enterprises project, Vocational Training project, Municipal Career Centres (MCCs) project)
- Civic Empowerment Programme (Leadership project, Workshops and Awareness Activities project, Civil Society project)
- Social reintegration Programme (Psychological support project, Getting married project, Communal Activities project)
- Education Programme (Higher Education project, English language courses project, E-learning project)
- Integration and Disarmament <sup>2</sup> Programme (Integration project, Contribution to Disarmament project)

The overall strategy is to provide reintegration assistance to motivate former Thuwar to Disarm<sup>3</sup> and Demobilise (RDD); to implement programmes with and through government and other partners; and to ensure sustainability through gradual ownership of the LPRD initiated services by the relevant Libyan institutions. LPRD, in close collaboration with relevant line ministries, designs, coordinates and supervises the implementation of these programmes, and monitors their effectiveness. It is understood that the LPRD is a programme and has a limited existence; therefore the vision of LPRD is to assist in the capacity development of the relevant Libyan institutions so they can gradually take over the services initiated by LPRD, and start providing the same services to the wider Libyan population.

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<sup>1</sup> Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. (888) 2013 Article (4).

<sup>2</sup> It is crucial that groups, group leaders and individuals all understand that the term ‘disarmament’ when used throughout this strategy does not necessarily mean the physical or permanent deprivation of weapons from individuals or groups. The term ‘disarmament’ covers a wide range of processes and techniques used to reduce the potential for the inappropriate or illicit use of weapons. These could include, for example; 1) weapons registration; 2) local storage solutions; 3) placing of weapons beyond immediate use by armed groups; 4) local storage with ‘dual key’ control systems; 5) separation of weapon main bodies and working parts during individual storage; 6) voluntary weapons surrender; or 7) collective storage in government controlled facilities. The disarmament technique selected as being the most appropriate will be dependent on; 1) the local security environment; 2) open negotiation and discussion; and 3) integration programme entry requirements.

<sup>3</sup> Footnote 2 above also applies to the term ‘Disarm’.

This document outlines one of the five programme strategies: the Integration & Disarmament Programme strategy.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> This strategy is drafted by Sean Armstrong, Adrian Wilkinson, Habib EL Mrabt, Jan-Jilles van der Hoeven and Irma Specht of Transition International, as part of the consultancy support provided to LPRD, funded by USAID. The strategy is approved and adopted by LPRD senior management, and reflects the views and plans of the whole organisation. The strategy is the result of an intense consultation and participatory process with LPRD senior staff, especially Dr. Faisal Sultan.

## 2. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN LIBYA

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### 2.1 LIBYAN SECURITY SITUATION

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The actual fragmentation of the Libyan security landscape reflects political divisions and longer-term structural issues that can be summarized as follows:

- Gaddafi neglect of the national security institutions (National Army & Police) along with other institutions. The Regime was only focusing on his own special forces;
- Regional friction and political factionalism: the Libyan society is basically divided among lines with three major regional divisions: East, West & South. These three regions are culturally and politically different and their interests are often opposing;
- Geographically uneven and uncoordinated development;
- Lack of formal accountability for, and surplus of, weapons combined with a deficit in trust. After the fall of the regime, and with uncontrolled borders, Libya became a scene for all kind of arms and weapons deals;
- Absence of a strong, respected executive authority;
- Widespread feeling among many armed fighters that the new National Army lacks both relevance and legitimacy<sup>5</sup>.

Essentially, the Libyan main issue is political and people are unlikely to fully surrender arms and demobilise before they have confidence in the political process and the security environment. The fragmentation of the security environment reflects distrust among various stakeholders and has developed uncertainty regarding who has the legitimacy to lead during the post-revolution period. The proliferation of armed groups, and in particular their overlapping presence in various Libyan cities, has exacerbated divisions among parties that used to be allies during the revolution. A major divide is about contrasting narratives of legitimacy and roles in the revolution with Eastern-based parties emphasise that they were the first to defect and start the uprising, while Tripoli parties point to the fact that they were first to reach Tripoli from the west as well as first to lend a hand to the uprising in the capital. The Libyan security environment is facing important challenges:

- Political polarisation, which could lead to the further politicisation of the security forces and a lack of political will to support the security sector reform (SSR);
- Internal resistance by anti-reform factions within the security sector. This resistance seems to harden mainly after the implementation of the Isolation Law;
- Geography and security (size, low population density, long uncontrolled borders): the control of Libyan borders poses a significant problem. Security forces are not adequately equipped to protect Libya's 4,348km long land border and 1,770km of coastline. As a result,

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<sup>5</sup> Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges after Kaddafi, Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°115, 14 December 2013.

it has been very difficult to prevent illegal trafficking of people, weapons and drugs. This leads to instability, especially in the southern part of the country, which is infamous for its migrant trails, cross-border smuggling, weapons proliferation, tribal conflicts and presence of armed extremists;

- Limited capacity and a lack of qualified human resources;
- Weak democratic institutions;
- Limited knowledge and experience of Security Sector Reform requirements among the stakeholders;
- Incomplete RDD (Reintegration, Demobilisation & Disarmament) of former Thuwars, mainly due to lack of timely political support, lack of coordination and flexibility between LPRD and other security sector stakeholders. This is exacerbated by the lack of effective and targeted international support;
- External interference and connections to unstable MENA countries;
- Destructive politicised media fuelling differences and conflict in the absence of any regulations on the new “freedom of speech”;
- Social sensitivities revived by recurrent events: Libya is facing continuous confrontations between tribes, minorities and Kaddafi loyalists. The recurrent instability in all regions clearly illustrates this fact; and a
- Religious factor: instead of being a unifying factor, it seems that religion is more likely a dividing one. Many factions are acting within the same Islamist background, but with their own interpretation and understanding of the Islam and how it should be implemented.

Security levels have not yet met the aspirations of the population. In recent surveys, conducted in May, September and November 2013, one in five (20%) Libyans felt unsafe at home or in their neighbourhood<sup>6</sup>. Recent security developments mean that this figure is now certainly much higher. The same studies indicate that 30% (though again this figure is almost certainly higher) of Libyan homes have firearms, but as with LPRD participants, they would happily surrender weapons if the Government could improve the security situation.

Many risks have to be carefully managed:

- Risk of internal armed conflict: to deal with this challenge, a political consensus is required. Favouring any political or ethnic group is extremely hazardous.
- Clientelism and corruption: mismanagement of the Libyan Security Sector Reform can be linked to the deeply rooted corruption and clientelism, encouraged during the times of the previous regimes.
- Partial solutions and selective approach to Security Sector Reform: disproportional support of some dimensions of the Security Sector Reform at the expense of others may only worsen the situation (e.g. focusing only on the fight against terrorism). National ownership

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<sup>6</sup> JMW consulting and National Democratic Institutes, 2013.



is also required for any initiative in order to be accepted and supported by local communities.

- Oversight of future trained units: building efficient and well qualified units requires sufficient safeguards to ensure that such an elite force will be under oversight of National authorities, and not be used for interests of any political actor or group.
- Private sector security is not recommended at the current stage because it might be just a simple legitimating of armed groups. If this option is available, all armed groups will prefer to convert to private security firms starting to gain money officially providing security services, and becoming more powerful.

## 2.2 LIBYAN SECURITY SECTOR

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The 'security sector' is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. The security sector can include defence, law enforcement, correction systems, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Particular emphasis should also be given to actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security<sup>7</sup>.

In order to be comprehensive, the Integration & Disarmament strategy has to take into consideration three categories of actors, while simultaneously dealing with: 1) a changing security local or national security environment; and 2) the varying pace of other SSR initiatives:

- State Security Providers: military forces, civilian police, specialized police units, presidential guards, intelligence services, coast guards, border patrols, customs authorities, highway police, reserve or local security units, civil defence units, national guards, etc.
- Governmental Security Management and Oversight Bodies: Parliament, Top Executive Authorities (President, and Prime Minister), national security advisory bodies, Ministries of Defence, Interior and Justice, financial management bodies, local government authorities, auditing bodies, official public complaints commissions, etc.
- Civil Society: policy analysis organisations (think tanks and universities), advocacy organisations, human rights commissions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media, etc.

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<sup>7</sup> The Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), UN 2010

A national vision of the security sector should provide the basis for decisions to define central elements of the size and composition of Libyan security sector. This may lead to the downsizing, restructuring or the creation of new security institutions. Thus the consequent need for, and national capacity for, the reintegration of former Thuwars (National Guard, gendarmerie, etc.) into the new, and as yet, unshaped security sector has still to be fully determined.

LPRD can offer complementary approaches that directly link the reintegration of former Thuwars to building national security sector capability. This will enhance the sustainability and legitimacy of both security reforms and the LPRD itself. LPRD must reflect national capacities, objectives and values as part of an integrated broader vision for national security. Failing to consider these issues together may lead to the development of unsustainable and unaccountable security institutions that fail to address the real security needs of Libya and Libyans.

### 3. THE OVERALL PROGRAMME STRATEGY

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#### 3.1 RATIONAL OF THE PROGRAMME

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LPRD is mandated to contribute to the integration and disarmament processes of the Government of Libya. The Integration and Disarmament strategy developed and presented in this document, reflects a realistic and achievable LPRD RDD strategy based on international best practices. It contributes directly towards the implementation of the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. (888) 2013.

The LPRD implementation strategy is three fold; 1) to provide Reintegration assistance to motivate former Thuwar to Disarm and Demobilise (RDD); 2) to implement partnership based programmes; and 3) to ensure sustainability through gradual ownership transfer of the LPRD initiated services to the relevant Libyan institutions.

The aim of the LPRD strategy is to make a solid contribution to the Governments effort to maintain control of the security environment, through a coordinated RDD awareness campaign and disarmament process, whilst concurrently integrating former Thuwar into the security agencies.

The LPRD Integration and Disarmament programme is thus critical to the success of the overall LPRD programme. Coordination with Government authorities will be critical, as the LPRDs RDD programme must be coherently and synergistically implemented within the broader Libyan Security Sector Reform and stabilisation frameworks. While this alignment is vital, it also constitutes the main vulnerability of the programme, as the Government's Security Sector Reform strategy is still being defined against the background of a changing security environment. Therefore, this strategy should be constantly updated to reflect national priorities and broader Security Sector Reform strategies, as they develop.

Oversight of the LPRD integration and disarmament strategy will be through a newly established Integration and Disarmament Steering Committee, which will include, among others, representation of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, the Prime Minister's Office, and civil society representation (more details are in chapter 5),. This will ensure national ownership of the programme and that it is integrated effectively within wider security sector reform.

The strategy defines how the programme will contribute to overcoming some of the current security challenges. It defines the objectives, outcomes and the main activities required for the integration of former Thuwar into security institutions, as well as the LPRD contribution to disarmament.

The success of the LPRD Integration and Disarmament strategy is thus dependent on LPRD:

- Capacity to reach out and retain the support of the former Thuwar;
- Agreement with the Government and relevant Ministries the strategy, protocols and how to synchronise the LPRD strategy into to the wider Libyan Security Sector Reform programme; and
- Ability to win and maintain the confidence of the wider Libyan population.

### 3.2 PROGRAMME APPROACH AND PROJECTS LINKAGES

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The on-going conflict has left the population of Libya divided on many fronts. The division has most directly impacted the security forces with factions engaging in open warfare and civilian groups taking up weapons to defend their communities or to liberate the country. This implosion has left security forces divided, absent from part of the country and not in a position to provide consistent and centrally controlled basic security to the Libyan population.

**The integration project** will contribute to rebuilding the national security forces by including capable and vetted former Thuwar into the new forces. Including some former Thuwar will ensure representative based security forces, facilitate their acceptance by local populations, and allow them to extend their coverage of the **national** territory. So far 4,800 former Thuwar have joined the army and police with the assistance of LPRD. The target for the next three years is to further facilitate the integration of up to 14,700 former Thuwar registered in the LPRD database. In doing so LPRD works closely with the Ministries of Defence and Interior. Not only by selecting appropriate candidates for integration but also by assisting in their vetting, health screening and training. Integration is done on an individual and not brigade basis, in order to not further strengthen the previous command structures of the shields and armed groups.

The other component of the Integration and Disarmament programme is the disarmament project. **The disarmament project** strategy outlines the contribution LPRD intends to make to the broader national disarmament and weapons control processes. It aims to contribute to raising awareness on the negative consequences of arms possession and misuse, and emphasises the benefits of weapons control in reducing the number of incidents involving the accidental use or misuse of arms. It also comprises technical control measures to manage and control weapons as weapons are being securely stored or voluntarily surrendered in the context of participation in the RDD programme. The LPRD best practices and capacities developed can then be used in the wider Government process, ensuring consistency of the necessary standards and administrative processes.

The concept of disarmament does not necessarily require the physical and compulsory handover of weapons. It includes, for example, weapons accounting protocols, safe and secure storage, dual-key systems for local storage, and training of technical staff. These are collectively known as 'Weapons Control Systems (WCS)', and it is the development and implementation of effective

WCS that is key to the RDD programme. The physical handover of weapons to full government control can take place later in the process as the security environment and group/individual confidence improves. Incremental and progressive components of this broader weapons control strategy may be implemented as the security environment changes, whilst concurrently building confidence between all stakeholders in the 'fairness' of the process. This is the key distinction between 'disarmament' and the 'weapons control' component of disarmament, which must be emphasised to all stakeholders.


The LPRD disarmament strategy will thus be carefully coordinated with the Government and the Ministries to ensure that they can match the requirements and timing of the LPRD initiatives in this area. Furthermore, it will develop with the Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Interior the capacity and capability to inspect, account, control, store and destroy weapons through agreed protocols consistent, with existing administrative requirements, in the relevant Government Ministries.

A key component of the disarmament component is the establishment of a Joint Weapons Control Office in the Ministry of Defence, which would be managed and operated by LPRD trained former Thuwar. This Office should include representatives from all stakeholders in its management and oversight. The role of the JWCO would then be to directly manage the implementation of the disarmament programme under the direction of the LPRD Disarmament Programme Manager, whilst liaising with the Ministry of Defence on the necessary security issues inherent in any disarmament process.

A further complementary component between disarmament and integration is the proposal to integrate a selected number of former Thuwar into the Ministry of Defence logistic units, having being trained on an Armoury Management Course (AMC)<sup>8</sup>. The AMC is designed to develop individual's capacity to implement safe and effective weapons control. The rationale behind this approach is that former Thuwar will have greater trust to eventually handover full control of their weapons to their former colleagues who would by then be embedded into the Ministry of Defence logistic units and trained for this task specifically. The subsequent step leads to a 'Train the Trainers' course where talented former Thuwar will be identified, mentored and qualified as AMC instructors. This leads to an effective Libyan national capacity for weapons control. The diagram below visualises this approach:

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<sup>8</sup> Developed to ISACS standards and delivered by professionally qualified weapons technicians.



### 3.3 PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES AND INDICATORS

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#### Programme Objectives

The overall aim of the integration and disarmament programme is *to contribute to security and the stabilisation of Libya*. In order for LPRD to contribute to improving security and stabilisation, it has developed two projects;

- 1) The integration of former Thuwar (14,700 of 165,000 eligible participants) into the new security sector of Libya; and
- 2) Contributing to the disarmament of Libya.

The objective of the **integration project** is *to select, negotiate and implement the training and placement of former Thuwar in Libya's new security forces. It will also assist the Government of Libya in clearing, validating and coherently merging databases related to Thuwar and the broader security sector.*

The objective of the **disarmament project** is *to contribute to the Government of Libya's disarmament and weapons control programmes, focussing on the disarmament of former Thuwar.*

The programme will work towards the two overarching intended outcomes:

***Outcome 1: Security and stability improved by the integration of 14,700 transparently selected, properly vetted, and professionally trained participants into the national security forces.***

***Outcome 2: Efficient and trusted management of weapons, as a prelude to national disarmament process, is achieved and the Libyan population is made aware on the importance of weapons control and disarmament.***

### 3.4 SELECTION CRITERIA

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The LPRD I&D Programme is applying the following definition of former Thuwar:

*Those who fought in the front lines, defended cities and released political prisoners*

Initially 220,000 former Thuwar were registered. After vetting, 165,000 were selected to be Reintegrated, Demobilised and Disarmed (RDD). 2013 saw a pilot group of 10% and in 2014, 2015 and 2016, 30% per year will be assisted.

Targeting and selection priority for LPRD participants in the integration and disarmament process is crucial to the success of the overall LPRD programme. The Integration and Disarmament projects have the following generic targeting criteria:

**Integration Project** (following criteria of the specific security forces)

- Age;
- Education level;
- Physical fitness (based on medical checks);
- Specialties or vocational skills;
- Entry exam;
- Passing the Vetting process;
- Social and regional inclusiveness; and
- Individual's preference.

**Disarmament Project**

- All former Thuwar (starting with those who travel abroad and those selected for integration).
- The Libyan population at large in terms of awareness.

It is envisaged that all LPRD programme participants will attend an initial one day induction workshop to: 1) be briefed on the disarmament process; 2) provide details of the weapons they

possess<sup>9</sup>; 3) receive weapons safety training and weapons safety cards; 4) be introduced to Gender Sensitivity, the Rule of Law, Human Rights (HR) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL); and 5) sign an oath that they will maintain effective control of the weapons they possess until formally handed over to government control. They will only physically surrender their weapon at an appropriate time, which will be dependent on the weapons control system being applied to their particular Thuwar group<sup>10</sup>.

There might be LPRD participants wishing to hand in weapons ahead of the planned programme and this should be factored into plans.

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<sup>9</sup> Type, Model, Calibre, Serial Number, Markings and Quantity. These details will be entered in the database and cross checked against the weapon when the individual physically enters the integration programme system.

<sup>10</sup> The LPRD project team will enter into negotiation with the various Thuwar Leaderships to determine what type of weapons control system is acceptable to them and would be 100% supported by them.



## 4. PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS

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### 4.1 INTEGRATION PROJECT STRATEGY

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#### 4.1.1 INTRODUCTION

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Former Thuwar are important stakeholders in the current security environment in Libya. On one hand, they provide an interim level of security in areas where government has no control. On the other hand, they pose a security threat in areas where the new police and army is present but where armed groups are unwilling to give up their power. The integration project will contribute to the restructuring of the national security forces by including capable and vetted former Thuwar into the new forces. The inclusion of former Thuwar will ensure a mixed and balanced composition to the security forces and thus improve their representativeness. This will then facilitate their acceptance by local populations, and allow security forces to extend their coverage into a greater share of the national territory.

The integration project is pursuing a double objective:

- To select, negotiate and implement the training and placement of former Thuwar in Libya's new security forces; and
- To assist security sector stakeholders build and merge national databases related to former Thuwar. (LPRD will transfer their MIS (Management of Information System) to State partners at the appropriate time).

LPRD has been very active from the initial stages of the RDD Programme to ensure effective integration of former Thuwar in the Libyan security forces. The following accomplishments have been achieved so far:

- Active participation in governmental committees for integration in security sector and disarmament.
- 4,500 former Thuwar are already integrated into the security sector.
- Separate agreements are already in place with security stakeholders to integrate adequate numbers of former Thuwar in their units as follows:

Security Agency	Thuwar Placements Agreed	Role / Remarks
Army	5,000	Soldiers
Border and Oil Installations Guards	8,055	Guards
Police (Agriculture)	3,000	Police Officers
Education Ministry	9,000	Guards
Police (Ministry of Interior)	16,000	Police Officers
TOTAL	41,055	

The implementation of the above agreements is still pending. Most of the partners argue the lack of training budget and the complexity of the procedures as a reason for the delay in implementation.

Additionally the Security High Committee (SHC) has trained two Katibas respectively in Turkey (270 individuals) and Italy (230 individuals) in order to integrate them in the Army. Despite all demobilisation principles, which recommend separation of former combatants from the systematic command and control structure of their armed groups, these units were trained as organic units including their own chain of command. On return to Libya, these two units have not yet been incorporated into any security forces. This delay in their integration is a major risk. Firstly, the training has reinforced the team spirit and the individual's pride of belonging to their Katiba, which will complicate their integration in any unit. Secondly, such well trained, equipped and uncontrolled units could easily join any of the actual fighting antagonists within Libya.

### Integration challenges

Integrating former Thuwars in new security forces generates various challenges:

- **Former Thuwars attitudes and behaviours.** The heroic self esteem of some of the former Thuwars and their refusal to take orders from officers who took no part in the Revolution make their integration more complex. Many of former Thuwars consider that being disciplined means going back to Kaddafi era. Specific psychosocial support and dedicated training is required for a successful transition into the security sector.
- **Rank harmonisation.** The integration of former Thuwars to the Army requires the attribution of military ranks. This is a very complicated issue. Thuwar leaders may not necessarily possess the skills and education necessary for successful integration as senior officers in operational units. The creation of civilian positions in the security forces hierarchy could solve this issue, but it would be an unusual approach. Some countries have instituted a deputy position at military senior levels (starting for example at the rank of Colonel). This civilian deputy position is in charge of the administrative and logistic affairs of the unit, while the military chief is responsible for operational issues. Immediately after the revolution, officers who had been banned by Kaddafi were allowed to rejoin the Army with retrospective rank promotion, which allowed them to join the top of the hierarchy, thus complicating the leadership issues for the whole institution.
- **Army former Thuwars.** Numerous military personnel joined the revolution at an early stage, and once the revolution was over they rejoined their initial units. Their role was crucial to the success of the former Thuwars because: 1) they refused Kaddafi's orders to attack the Thuwar; 2) they trained the non-experienced Thuwars who had no idea about arms and weapons handling; and 3) they provided logistic support, arms and equipment in the early stages of the revolution. This specific category of Thuwars must be taken into account while

implementing the integration process, and a separate agreement reached with the Army Chief of Staff for this special Thuwar category.

- **Vetting.** Defining and applying minimum standards in relation to required skills and past conduct as integration criteria for former Thuwars should be approached cautiously. Some parties may advocate the vetting all members of the security institution, not just ex-combatants. This would be risky for the integrity of the security institutions and should not be an issue for LPRD.
- **Balancing security sector integration with other projects.** Incentives for integration into the security sector must be balanced with other LPRD projects criteria and advantages to ensure sustainable integration process. Integrated former Thuwars will undoubtedly compare their benefits with their former colleagues joining other LPRD projects. Former Thuwars desiring to join security forces must be made fully aware of the options they have to avoid any misperceptions.

### Success factors

The success of the integration process of former Thuwars is dependent on the following factors:

- **Trust building between security sector stakeholders.** Many former Thuwar tend to view the National Army as compromised because: 1) it did not overtly participate in the revolutionary conflict; and 2) the presence in their ranks of some officers who enjoyed long military careers under the Kaddafi regime. In contrast, many Army officers view the former Thuwars as undisciplined, uncoordinated upstarts seeking to advance their narrow agendas within the military institution.
- **Compatibility with Government security sector strategy.** The integration programme must be in harmony with any Security Sector Reform strategy initiated by the Government. LPRD should be an active member of the strategising Team.
- **Security stakeholders understanding their role in Libyan RDD.** Integration planning has to be coordinated with the military, police and other community level security providers. Each party should have a clear vision of its role and the others' expectations.
- **Funds and budget availability.** Access to the appropriate level of funding is a crucial short to medium term requirement. The consequences of the project stalling once started could be catastrophic to the security environment in Libya. Once destroyed, rebuilding any level of trust is a very difficult task.

- **National security forces management capacity building.** LPRD should assist the current security forces to build their management capability<sup>11</sup>.
- **Political will.** This is the pre-condition for any effective integration effort in Libya. LPRD can start lobbying for a broad national political consensus.

The integration project will therefore contribute to:

- The transition of former Thuwar into formal State controlled security forces.
- Improving the image of security forces and thus increasing trust between population and security forces.
- Positively impacting on the overall security situation in the country.

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#### 4.1.2 INTEGRATION PROJECT APPROACH

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Through the integration programme an initial target number of 14,700 personnel will be integrated in the security forces. The total numbers of LPRD participants who will integrate into the different Ministries will need to be agreed with the government. The project will monitor the Integration process and assess the level of retention of the participants into the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior forces. A survey will be undertaken every six months for the duration of the project.

Participants will be selected on the basis of pre-defined criteria (see above) coherent with those used by the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior for their recruitment. A selection committee to include representatives of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior and LPRD will check the candidates against the criteria. The criteria will be established jointly and be cleared by the Government of Libya. Participants will then be vetted to ensure they have no criminal past and that they are morally and legally fitted to become members of security forces. The vetting process will be defined at the beginning of the project and will be approved by the Libyan authorities. Individuals refused entry into the integration programme will have a chance to appeal and have their applications reviewed by a Joint Appeals Committee (JAC).

The selected individuals will then all attend a one-day initial induction workshop (see Page 12) prior to commencing any necessary training prior to joining their new organisation.

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<sup>11</sup> It is recommended that as part of the integration programme a training institution be developed (with international support) within Libya to provide introductory training for selected participants on: 1) Resource Based Project Management (PM); 2) Change Management (CM); and 3) the Management of Risk (MoR). This will ensure that all appropriate staff: 1) 'speak' the same 'technical language', which is internationally recognised, for management during the change process; 2) have received the same level of training; and 3) may receive an internationally accredited qualification in Project and Risk Management. This will enable better educated participants to be trained to fill mid-level management positions within the Ministries of Defence and Interior.

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### 4.1.3 INTEGRATION PROJECT OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIES

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The project will undertake the following activities to produce its outputs:

**Output 1. In collaboration with the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior, the LPRD establish selection criteria, vetting mechanisms, and develop relevant Standard Operating Procedures for the selection of eligible former Thuwar.**

Activity 1.1: LPRD will actively participate in the existing and future Government committees on Disarmament and on Integration.

Activity 1.2: Develop Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for Integration.

Activity 1.3: Libyan Authorities endorse the Standard Operating Procedures, criteria and vetting mechanisms.

**Output 2. Security forces capacity on management of information systems and databases developed.**

Activity 2.1: LPRD technically assists security sector stakeholders by developing their databases.

Activity 2.2: Harmonise the security sector stakeholders' databases with the LPRD information system.

**Output 3. 14,700 former Thuwar are selected, vetted and trained for integration into the Libyan security forces.**

Activity 3.1: Based on the updated database, prepare a list of potential candidates for integration.

Activity 3.2: Establish a joint selection and vetting committee.

Activity 3.3: Screen candidates against selection criteria and vetting procedure.

Activity 3.4: Share the list of 14,700 participants with the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior and initiate the official recruitment process for transfer to these Ministries.

Activity 3.5: Adapt the curriculum for training of Former Thuwar to meet the needs of the trainees.

Activity 3.6: Individuals attend one-day induction course. (Be prepared to implement Activity 4.2).

Activity 3.7: Hire relevant training capacities and initiate training.

**Output 4. 14,700 successfully selected candidates physically surrender their arms, are formally integrated into Libyan security forces and start receiving a salary.**

- Activity 4.1: Prepare Standard Operating Procedures for weapon surrender for validation by the relevant Libyan authorities (responsibility of Disarmament Programme).
- Activity 4.2: Safely and securely collect, check register and store weapons. (This could take place at Activity 3.6 for some individuals).
- Activity 4.3: The selected candidates join their new units and start their duties.
- Activity 4.4: The Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence add the integrated former Thuwars to their respective payrolls.
- Activity 4.5: The Ministry of Defence integrates former Thuwar into the Joint Weapons Control Office and Logistic Units (for AMC graduates).

**Output 5. Citizen perception on security forces is improved and Security Sector Reform initiated.**

- Activity 5.1: LPRD launches the Security Sector Dialogue Initiative.
- Activity 5.2: LPRD contributes to and supports proposals on Security Sector Reform.
- Activity 5.3: Former Thuwar support Security forces to improve their image nationwide.

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#### **4.1.4 IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES FOR INTEGRATION PROJECT**

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The integration process of former Thuwars in security forces is based on a holistic and multidimensional phased approach:

##### **Phase 1: Updating LPRD database**

Initially, 14,700 registered former Thuwars have expressed their desire to join the security forces. This total number is probably less today because many of them may, for the following reasons, have since changed their minds:

- Deterioration of the Army image among the former Thuwar.
- Disappointment among the first group of integrated former Thuwar. Their current military salary is practically half of that received while member of an armed group. Also, the military regime is too restrictive and tight for them; they had more latitude and flexibility in their previous units.
- The other opportunities offered by LPRD projects tend to be more attractive to former Thuwar, such as SME and Vocational Training projects.

##### **Phase 2: Database harmonisation with security sector stakeholders**

LPRD is the only organisation with relatively accurate and updated databases and a functioning Management Information System. Its role can be therefore be to help other partners reach that same level, by:

- Technically assisting the stakeholders (including State institutions and armed groups) to build their own databases and MIS.
- Harmonisation of databases. A mechanism<sup>12</sup> should be put in place to enable data exchange that allows for timely follow-up and eliminates duplication. Confidentiality issues should be taken into account to avoid or limit inappropriate use of the available data.

### **Phase 3:           Activation of the signed agreements**

Lobby for the implementation of signed agreements with the Ministries of Defence and Interior. LPRD can seize the opportunity of a newly elected Parliament and appointed Government to boost the implementation of the agreements already signed with different institutions.

### **Phase 4:           Capacity building for former Thuwars**

Give former Thuwar, willing to join the security forces, adequate training and support to make them successful in the entry exam of the military colleges. Capacity development is more important than simple integration (job placement only).

### **Phase 5:           Launching of a security sector dialogue initiative**

Launch of a dialogue initiative among security sector stakeholders under the supervision of the Parliament or Prime Minister. The commitment of the higher level decision-makers is required for the success of this initiative. Awareness and exchange workshops can be organised at higher levels before generalising the dialogue to all the levels. At the local level, CSOs can be very helpful and this initiative can be spearheaded by the LPRD civil society project, in close coordination with the Integration Project managers.

### **Phase 6:           Participating in Security Sector Reform**

Make a proposal regarding the security sector reform and participate actively in getting a national consensus.

### **Phase 7:           Supporting Security forces to improve their image nationwide**

Certainly, the National Army cannot be as bad as currently perceived by general Libyan public. This institution has professional Officers and needs support from the population. After the revolution, the former Thuwars used a lot of propaganda to weaken the Army as a legitimate State armed institution. Now, it's up to them to actively participate in improving this image. Former Thuwars and their leaders across Libya should be involved in this endeavour mainly by taking active part in a joint national communication campaign to improve the security forces image. CSO participation is key for the success of this phase.

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<sup>12</sup> If a system such as MS Access is used then 'metatags' can be used to easily transfer data between databases. MS Excel is a second option, but would be slow with thousands of names.

## 4.2 DISARMAMENT PROJECT STRATEGY

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### 4.2.1 INTRODUCTION

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The limited capacity of the Libyan government to supply the security demanded by the Libyan people has resulted in insecurity. This insecurity, in turn, has resulted in Libyan citizens arming themselves to protect their families. The dilemma is that citizens desperately need security and turn to militias and other groups to get it. The way out of this spiral is for the central government to provide, with international community support, security for the people by enhancing and supporting military and police capabilities, and by using tailored conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level.

The objective of the disarmament project is to contribute to the Government of Libya's disarmament and weapons control systems, by focussing on the disarmament of former Thuwar, applying the RDD approach and raising awareness in communities around Libya as to the importance of weapons control and disarmament.

#### **Weapons control as a prelude to Physical Disarmament**

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.<sup>13</sup> In the context of Libya this term will be replaced by 'physical disarmament'.

LPRD will use the term 'disarmament' to mean the wide range of processes and techniques used to reduce the potential for the inappropriate or illicit use of weapons. These include: 1) weapons registration; 2) local storage solutions; 3) placing of weapons beyond immediate use by armed groups; 4) local storage with 'dual key' control systems; 5) separation of weapon main bodies and working parts during individual storage; 6) voluntary weapons surrender; or 7) collective storage in government controlled facilities. The disarmament technique selected as being the most appropriate for an individual or armed group will be dependent on; 1) the local security environment; 2) open negotiation and discussion; and 3) integration programme entry requirements.

The disarmament component of LPRD programme is only one aspect of national arms control and reduction, and should support future related measures. The whole Libyan disarmament programme needs to be comprehensive, effective, efficient and safe. It should be specifically designed and planned at the highest level to respond to the country's Security Sector Reform strategy. Physical disarmament and weapons control are intrinsically linked, and should

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<sup>13</sup> The Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), UN 2010.



therefore be closely coordinated. Yet the security environment within Libya means that it is preferable that they remain separated, phased, and carried out in different time frameworks. This allows avoiding possible confusion that may lead to an increased tension and local outbreaks of violence. The weapons control systems should be designed as a prelude to a future and wider physical disarmament process.

Whilst physical disarmament focuses on individual members of armed forces and groups, their dependants, women and children associated with armed forces and groups, weapons control deals also with individual civilians, including women and children, organised criminal groups, communities, national authorities and others. Thus, the weapons control process has to be available Libya wide, with the techniques been made available by LPRD to other interested stakeholders. Sensitisation and core communication messages must be carefully developed and managed.

Under the current conditions in Libya, physical disarmament would be a very complicated process and any strategy is extremely politically sensitive. Thus the LPRD recommendation to adopt, initially, a weapons control strategy for the following reasons:

- **Lack of trust between parties.** Today, few of the armed groups are willing to proceed to full physical disarmament because they are afraid that other armed groups will take advantage of a sudden change in their favour in the balance of military capability.
- **Lack of trust in the Government of Libya and its institutions.** People will have no faith in handing their weapons in to authorities they do not trust.
- **Unknown stock levels of weapons.** The quantity of weapons retained by the armed groups is not known. None of the parties will enable others to monitor or verify their stocks.
- **Lack of specific capacity.** Physical disarmament requires careful planning, transparent procedures, and an effective information and sensitisation strategy throughout the process. Technical capacity (collection, accounting, storage, security, etc.) is a core requirement. None of this seems to be currently available within the Libyan authorities' capacities, hence the LPRD recommendation for the development of a JWCO and technical armoury management training as an integration course option.
- **New Constitution.** The developing Libyan Constitution may take a clear position regarding civilian possession of weapons, thus full physical disarmament may become unnecessary, as it would be replaced by weapons registration.

### **Weapons control as a Libyan RDD component**

In the Libyan security environment, weapons control can help minimise the social, economic and environmental impacts of uncontrolled weapons, by reducing the number of weapons in circulation and by strengthening weapons control mechanisms. This will reduce the need for former Thuwar to require their weapons on a daily basis and will thus contribute to their willingness to physically disarm, in the future.

The objectives of a weapons control process should be to:

- Reduce the availability and use of weapons in Libyan society;
- Reduce the number of weapons related accidents and incidents;
- Increase public awareness of the connection between the availability of weapons and the level of violence in society;
- Reduce and disrupt the illicit transfers of weapons at the national and regional levels, mainly through the uncontrolled Libyan borders;
- Regulate the possession and use of weapons through national legislation and registration;
- Reduce the visibility of weapons in the community, and counteracting the culture of weapons, especially among the youth;
- Reduce gender-based violence related to holding and carrying of weapons legally or illegally; and
- Improve daily citizens' security and contribute to the national development process.

Registering weapons, as an initial first step, will ensure that holders are properly accountable for their weapons. A computerized management information system is essential and may be useful in future weapons tracking (type, calibre, serial number, manufacturer, holder, etc.).

#### **Weapons control success conditions**

Weapons control is a complex process requiring an holistic approach dealing with both the supply and demand for weapons by all parties. The following conditions are required to ensure the fulfilment of any national arms control objectives:

- **National Legislation.** Effective weapons control is unlikely to be successful without the establishment and enforcement of an adequate national legal framework, in harmony with the international standards. Revising and updating national legislation is a time and resource-intensive process, which needs to be speeded up by involving the members of the new elected Libyan Parliament.
- **Unity of Effort.** Weapons control involves all national and international stakeholders. Dealing with weapons control by parallel or non-coordinated actions will lead to confusing situations. It is highly recommended that a unique inclusive national initiative supported by all local stakeholders and international community is developed. LPRD is the institution best placed to launch and lead this national initiative.
- **National Capacity.** Weapons control processes require qualified and trained teams for specific logistic and technical issues. LPRD can coordinate with the other parties (mainly Ministries of Defence and Interior) to build these national capabilities during the RDD programme. Hence the LPRD recommendation for a JWCO and armoury management courses.

- **An information and sensitisation campaign.** A very efficient communication strategy will allow for raising public awareness and sensitising them to the ongoing weapons control processes.
- **Inclusiveness.** Partnerships should be broader than security and law enforcement agencies to include the armed groups, a number of ministerial departments (justice, youth, foreign affairs, etc.) and eventually civil society organisations.
- **International Support.** Arms control furthermore requires action at global, regional, national and local levels, and involves international and regional organisations, national governments, commercial companies and military stakeholders, non-governmental organisations and non-state actors. International support is required.

The LPRD disarmament programme can not, of course, achieve all of the above during the RDD programme, but the systems and processes they develop can be easily transferred and scaled up to a national initiative level.

#### **Weapons control risk management**

- **Security and safety issues.** Arms control involves personnel and communities' direct security and safety. Qualified teams, necessary technical equipment, clear operational procedures (Standard Operating Procedures) must be developed to mitigate weapon and ammunition related hazards.
- **Financial issues.** The LPRD programme shall avoid, and convince other parties from, attaching monetary value to weapons. Weapons registration, as opposed to Weapons in Exchange for Development initiatives, should be encouraged. Any weapons collection processes should last a relatively short time to avoid the creation of a parallel weapons market.
- **Arms Culture.** The possession of weapons might become of cultural significance and considered as habitual among Libyans. An integrated communication campaign and an efficient CSO action is thus required to negate the development of any arms culture.
- **The security situation.** The longer civilians feel they need to remain armed for personal security because local police or security forces are unable to protect them, then the more complicated the weapons control process becomes.

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#### **4.2.2 DISARMAMENT PROJECT APPROACH**

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The strategy of the disarmament project rests in its capacity to:

- **PERSUADE** individuals, groups and organisations that weapons possession and use is counterproductive to the development of a secure and prosperous future.
- **PREVENT** weapons accidents by education and awareness raising.
- **PROTECT** communities by encouraging safe and secure storage.
- **RE-ENHANCE** the Government capacity to register, safely store and manage the weapons.

The project will lay the ground for the medium term aim of a wider Libyan weapons control and management strategy. The disarmament strategy includes an LPRD awareness programme to minimise, and where possible to eliminate, the negative consequences of inadequate arms control. The LPRD strategy will contribute to the Government's disarmament efforts by focussing on a combination of risk reduction, awareness building, safe weapons storage and building trust and capacities for future physical disarmament. These, in collaboration with other social intervention programmes, should seek to change behaviour and facilitate appropriate alternative solutions over the long term.

The establishment of an LPRD Awareness campaign in partnership with key Government stakeholders will contribute to shaping perceptions of human security in order to create the conditions necessary for RDD process to be more efficient. To be effective, LPRD requires regional outreach to its participants and to the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior structures through a carefully structured organisational framework with trained LPRD staff. The Awareness Programme brings additional benefits of reinforcing Libyan citizens' positive views of former Thuwar members of the LPRD. It will also impact on Libyan citizens' perceptions and the behaviour of groups outside the political process.

The success of the LPRD disarmament strategy requires coordinated leadership from key leadership from the Prime Minister down. The Board of the LPRD and key LPRD leaders must continually lead and support the LPRD strategies including sanctions measures if individuals or groups fail to follow direction and guidance from the LPRD. This lead must be matched and be visible when the time is right with government and ministry leaders. The awareness programme can monitor the effectiveness of this programme by assessing the number of incidents or misuse by this target group. Best practice should be used to continually improve the LPRD strategy and future RDD programme.

The figure below summarizes the key activities of the project (further explained in the next section):



### Awareness

Awareness and sensitization campaign among population  
Awareness of stakeholders



### Weapons Control

Local storage (including empowerment of local groups to initially account for their own weapons)

National level storage

Registration of weapons

Contributes to the preparation of a draft national arms law and regulations

Develops weapons control processes and systems that can be transferred to the national level



### Physical Disarmament

Physical disarmament of LPRD programme participants

Contributing to wider national disarmament plans , processes and protocols

Develop physical collection processes and systems that can be transferred to the national level.



### Capacities

Setting up Joint Weapons Control Office

Armoury Management (AMC) training as an integration option

AMC graduates to MOD and MOI logistic units as weapons specialists

## 4.2.3 DISARMAMENT PROJECT OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIES

**Output 1. Population' perception of the security environment is improved by the LPRD awareness campaign.**

Activity 1.1: LPRD actively lobbies the Parliament and National Government to support the LPRD arms control initiative.

Activity 1.2: Develop and launch a national awareness media campaign.

Activity 1.3: Involve civil society organisations in the awareness campaign.

**Output 2. LPRD has actively contributed to a Libyan national arms law and regulation and lobbied for its approval and enforcement.**

Activity 2.1: LPRD contributes to a national consensus among all security stakeholders.

Activity 2.2: LPRD contributes to the preparation of a draft national arms law and regulation.

**Output 3. LPRD is an active actor in developing national arms and weapons control capacity.**

- Activity 3.1: LPRD actively seeks agreement with relevant Libyan stakeholders on protocols (such a weapons accounting protocols), processes and policies. In particular, LPRD develops the weapons control protocols, with a clear policy for non-compliance, for those LPRD participants who have or are about to be integrated in the Army or Police.
- Activity 3.2: LPRD assists in setting-up a Joint Weapons Control Office in the Ministry of Defence.
- Activity 3.3: LPRD assists, and where needed leads, in developing weapons registration and safe storage capacity for all relevant stakeholders.
- Activity 3.4: Select a number of former Thuwar from all over Libya to join the Ministry of Defence and train them on Armoury Management Courses. Selected graduates from the first AMC should be used to establish the JWCO.
- Activity 3.5: Organise disarmament of the new groups of LPRD participants who are either integrating into the military and police or going overseas on courses.
- Activity 3.6: Enrol the most talented former Thuwar into a 'Train the Trainers' Armoury Management course where they will be further mentored and qualified.
- Activity 3.7: LPRD assists in establishing secure and updated databases in key partner organisations.

**Output 4. Local storage of weapons initiated.**

- Activity 4.1: Initiate safe and secure storage systems or facilities at the local level. (Options to include provision of ISO-storage, weapons accounting software, dual key storage systems etc).
- Activity 4.2: Continue the on-going LPRD-led dialogue with armed groups on the control of local storage of weapons.
- Activity 4.3: Where appropriate, implement a dual-key system for local storage of weapons.

**Output 5. National disarmament process is established.**

- Activity 5.1: LPRD is a facilitator to eventually physically disarm all its programme participants on entry to integration training or subsequent employment.
- Activity 5.2: Gradually handover of the LPRD control systems and processes to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence.

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**4.2.4 IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES OF THE DISARMAMENT PROJECT**

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Until the Constitutional process comes to end, no final disarmament strategy can be drafted. The future Libyan Constitution may allow citizens the possession of arms, as many other countries in the world. Thus, the present strategy is more likely about control, regulating and the safe storage of weapons, which will be needed whatever option is decided in the Constitution.

The LPRD disarmament component is to be supported by an awareness campaign that runs in parallel with project implementation. The programme will change the perception of LPRD participants as the Government takes control of the security environment leading to LPRD participants eventually handing control of their weapons to the Government.

The programme priority for LPRD Disarmament project is to develop the weapons control processes and protocols for those LPRD participants who have or about to be integrated (14,700) into the Army or Police. The capacities developed in this process will lead to solid and tested protocols and operating procedures which can then be applied to the remainder of the former Thuwar who will follow the same framework and approaches based on the best practices and with the support of Government and the involved ministries.

Before the Arms control process starts, there should be an agreement among all parties and other key stakeholders about the detailed strategy and action plan. The adherence of all stakeholders is a key success factor of this strategy. Simultaneous and synchronized processing is mandatory.

The protocols and processes must be carefully coordinated with the Government, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior and other key government ministries to ensure unity of effort and approach. The LPRD disarmament approach can contribute to Government protocols to account for those Libyan citizens who are outside the target of LPRD, who wish to participate in a similar process of increased control of weapons.

Weapons control will be achieved through different and overlapping phases, ending up at a future physical disarmament phase.

### **Phase 1: Weapons control systems preparation**

This first phase is the most critical for the whole process because it will determine the degree of stakeholder involvement. Trust must be built and common ground established, focusing on state building instead of personal and or political interests. This phase consists of the following actions:

- **Information gathering and operational planning.** All stakeholders are invited to share and communicate the estimated amount of small arms and light weapons they might have in their possession. Based on these first elements operational planning may be defined to carry out the whole process.
- **Database preparation.** Weapons control cannot be done effectively and efficiently without simple, yet powerful and dedicated databases. A common agreed template, with required base data, must be approved in order to serve as reference for the registration process. LPRD support may be needed to help others to manage database development issues. A common database format means that weapons can be: 1) accounted for at the local level by armed groups; 2) registered during the LPRD

integration process; and 3) accounted for during the physical collection and subsequent storage of weapons at the national level.

- **Awareness campaign.** Such a sensitive endeavour can succeed only if there is a strong and continuous awareness campaign. A powerful communication strategy should be drafted with a clear implementation framework to raise public awareness on and involvement in weapons registration and control.
- **Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) Development.** Draft SOPs should be developed to cover the full range of weapon control processes. They can be amended as necessary during negotiation with armed groups and government, or when changing operational dynamics require such amendments.

## Phase 2: Capability and capacity development

The success of the weapons control process is tightly linked to resource availability, including qualified human resources, technical organisation and logistic issues (offices, software and hardware, security and safety, etc). Since its establishment, LPRD has developed a wide range of know-how that can be transferred to other Libyan Institutions. LPRD can assist in developing weapons control human and technical capacity for all other stakeholders once it has developed its own systems.

Critical to success of the LPRD disarmament programme is to have in place capacity in the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior to manage the outcome of a successful LPRD awareness strategy and to meet the demands of the LPRD disarmament programme.

- Some aspects of weapons management need to be in place before the LPRD implements its weapons control activities. The Government and Ministries need to have capabilities and protocols in place to ensure that the LPRD strategy can work. To that end, the Government must ensure that the capabilities, such as liaison officers, office space etc, are in place, so that the weapons control for 14,700 LPRD participants, who are being integrated into the Ministry of Defence and or Police, can take place safely and securely.
- The LPRD will assist in the establishment of a Joint Weapons Control Office (JCWO) in the Ministry of Defence to support the government. The JCWO will be staffed by LPRD recruited individuals<sup>14</sup>, with the MOD and MOI supplying Liaison Officers. The JCWO role will be to validate that LPRD participant's weapons are being correctly controlled during the RDD programme in accordance with both the LPRD weapons control protocols and any government requirements. Expert technical staff is required to manage the weapon control processes to ensure that they are safe and that the accounting is in accordance with international standards. Equally, the Government

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<sup>14</sup> It is proposed that some of these individuals should be graduates of the first Armoury Management Course.



needs to ensure, when these events take place that they have the capacity to meet the needs of those Libyans, outside the LPRD programme, who want to hand-in weapons or have them accounted for. The LPRD needs to ensure the protocols are in place, as failure to do so will diminish confidence in the LPRD as well as the Government, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior.

- The JWCO will also be responsible for the development and management of the weapons control databases. Co-location within the MOD will allow for easy transfer of data to full government control.
- In support of this stage the LPRD must have in place a sanctions policy and protocols to deal with those LPRD participants who fail to follow the LPRD strategy. These sanctions must be embedded prior to the LPRD disarmament being implemented otherwise miscreants will not be dealt with and it will undermine the strategy within the LPRD. This should be briefed during the one-day induction course that all participants attend.
- In order to contribute to resilience, capacity and confidence building it is recommended that the LPRD should implement an Armoury Management Course (AMC) with places for military and police to attend. The LPRD participants on successful completion could be integrated into the Ministries (either as uniformed personnel or as civil servants and based at the weapons storage facilities within logistic (or operational) units). This course will eventually lead to a 'Train the Trainers' course so that the Libyans can run courses themselves in the future.

### **Phase 3: Weapons control legislation**

The development of legislation is necessarily a lengthy issue, hence why it is Phase 3. Its implementation will likely be still ongoing when subsequent phases have been completed. Nevertheless this issue must be addressed at the earliest opportunity in order that subsequent national level disarmament may take place. Wider weapons control is a public process that should be implemented according to national regulation and international standards and best practice. According to the Resolution of Cabinet of Ministers No. (888) 2013, LPRD can: “propose legislation and regulations necessary for reintegration... Make the required proposals, in coordination with the relevant authorities, to disarm the Thuwar). The legal framework must be established at two levels:

- Parliamentary legislation. Parliament must be engaged with to legislate a specific legal framework allowing for weapons control and defining implementation modalities with clear responsibilities and accountability. There are numerous 'model arms laws' available that the LPRD may use as a basis for recommendation to Parliament for the Libyan Arms Laws.
- Decrees. Once the law is gazetted, the Government of Libya has to be supported to draft and publish the required decrees that will govern the wider disarmament process.

LPRD can organise workshops and study sessions to draft relevant text for consideration of the Parliament and the Government.

#### **Phase 4: Weapons accounting**

Once the preparatory phase has completed, a legal framework under development and awareness among the population has increased, the core phases of weapons control process can be implemented.

- A national campaign can be launched to influence the formal accounting for of weapons by armed groups. Negotiations with the leaders of armed groups should take place to persuade them to accept responsibility for accounting for the weapons under their groups' control. (See later on safe storage). They should be provided with the necessary software (database) and any necessary training.
- Individuals will have initially registered their weapon(s) during their one-day induction workshop on the RDD process. On commencement of integration training (or employment) their weapon(s) should be checked against the registration details and then placed in safe storage. The location of that safe storage to be determined by negotiation. (See later on safe storage).
- Some individuals may require retention of a weapon for personal protection., Such individuals should be issued with a 'Permit to carry' weapons by the LPRD. The design and issuance of such permits must be done in coordination with the Ministry of Interior and Police in order to prevent future 'misunderstandings'.

#### **Phase 5: Safe storage**

Initially weapons should be placed in a 'safe storage' location. This may be under either 1) local Thuwar, 2) LPRD, or 3) national government control.

- **Thuwar storage.** The LPRD should engage with all Thuwar groups and leaders to persuade them of the advantages of them being responsible for the implementation of safe storage systems as a precursor to wider RDD. LPRD should be prepared to provide them with the capacity for safe storage by the provision of iso-storage, or enhanced security of current buildings. As a confidence and security building measure (CSBM) negotiations for 'dual key' control of this storage should take place.
- **LPRD storage.** Individuals entering the initial RDD programme should place their weapons into storage controlled by the LPRD. This may be at a national facility, or in a separate 'dual key' controlled and 'sealed' facility of their parent Thuwar.
- **National storage.** Weapons may be stored at government controlled facilities, and on completion of the integration process 'participants' weapons should be transferred from Thuwar or LPRD control to government control. The LPRD should inspect such facilities and only use those that comply with international best practices. Improvement of such facilities will be one of the roles of the JCWO.

Negotiations for Thuwar/LPRD registration/accounting of weapons shall begin as soon as the protocols, processes and capabilities have been tested with a small LPRD/Ministry of Defence/Ministry of the Interior target group. Trained Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior staff (integrated with LPRD staff) will be responsible for weapons safety and handling training, weapons maintenance, armoury security, weapons accounting and compliance with International arms control conventions and protocols. It is proposed that this be after the first Armoury Management Course has graduated.

#### **Phase 6: Future operations**

Once the capacity of the MOD and MOI has been developed, the JWCO is fully operational and AMC graduates are deployed across MOD and MOI weapons storage (logistic) units the weapons control process will continue until all 165,000 former Thuwar have been processed through the RDD programme. LPRD weapons storage facilities and accounting systems will be fully handed over to Libyan government counterparts at the appropriate time. By this time the LPRD will also be positioned to potential support the government in a national physical disarmament initiative using systems developed during the RDD programme.

## 5. PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY

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For the LPRD integration and disarmament programme to deliver it is essential that there is a resilient and sustainable partnership mechanism in place with key ministries, relevant institutions, and international partners. This will ensure a unified approach to the wider Security Sector Reform programme. LPRD must continue to sit in the high level Security Sector Reform meetings so that it can contribute best practice to developing RDD and DDR strategies.

### Ministries

The LPRD partnership strategy is dependent on the unity of leadership of key stakeholders. This unity will ensure that LPRD integration and disarmament strategy is delivered successfully. The LPRD Weapons Control Strategy leads into the Government RDD process, as does its awareness programme. The disarmament phase and approach will be led by the Prime Minister's Office, as the successful disarmament of LPRD participants is linked to disarmament of both Libyan citizens and those outside the current political process.

To support the LPRD integration and disarmament strategy of weapons control an LPRD Steering Committee shall be formed as follows:

- President: Nominated by Prime Minister.
- Member: Representative of Ministry of Defence.
- Member: Representative of Ministry of Interior.
- Member: Representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Member: Representative of Ministry of Justice.
- Members: Selected Thuwar representatives.
- Member: Civil society representative.
- Advisor: Independent international technical specialist.
- Other Members may be appointed as required.

The LPRD Steering Committee has an oversight role and will be in charge of mainly:

- Validating the LPRD disarmament and integration strategy.
- Validating budget and resource mobilisation.
- Evaluating specific strategic and/or sensitive tasks or activities in support of the LPRD RDD programme.
- Review project implementation and provide strategic guidance to project staff.
- Provide strategic guidance to ensure harmonisation of integration and disarmament with wider RDD programmes and initiatives.

### Civil Society support

The role of civil society is crucial for wider integration and disarmament programmes. Partnership with CSO is required to improve the security forces images and to raise awareness about the disarmament strategy. The Integration and Disarmament programme will partner the

Civic Empowerment project with two of its projects on Leadership and Civil Society. The support of International NGOs is also crucial to the success of this programme.

### **International partners**

International partners could include, among others:

- UN Mission and agencies.
- African Union.
- Bilateral donors and partners.
- Overseas military institutions (Training schools, etc.).
- Consultancy firms and INGOs.

## 6. SUSTAINABILITY AND EXIT STRATEGY

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The key to sustainability and a viable exit strategy is to take confidence-building steps, which lead to Integration and Disarmament through an LPRD supported RDD process. The unity of LPRD participants is key to success and therefore key to the exit strategy too. Any effort to push former Thuwar to disarm before the security situation changes is likely to undermine the authority of the LPRD.

The exit strategy of LPRD from integration and disarmament is based on the assumption that as LPRD participants enter the integration and disarmament phase, and begin to have their weapons controlled and/or destroyed the overall responsibility for disarmament moves to the Libyan Government. Through its activities, the LPRD will provide lessons and protocols on disarmament, possibly including that of civilians. Capacities of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior will also be strengthened in order for these ministries to take leadership in future disarmament activities.

Sustainability rests on LPRD and key stakeholders developing the capacity to deliver on disarmament and integration, matched to the timing of implementation of the LPRD Integration & Disarmament programme. As stated earlier, here it is key that RDD AMC graduates are integrated into the LPRD, JCWO and security force logistic units. This will put in place a joint capacity to manage and deliver the capability to train, control, store and secure or destroy weapons across Libya. The Libyan Government will require the capacity to control weapons post RDD. To that end LPRD participants should be considered for integration in the appropriate ministries to support government capacity and capability building in this area.

## 7. GENDER STRATEGY

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While the main target group of this strategy are the former male Thuwar, for the programme to be successful the engagement of women is required, as they can play a critical role in changing perceptions, behaviours and attitudes of their grandfathers, husbands, brothers and sons. It is for example important that women are given key roles to contribute to both the LPRD awareness campaign and the weapons control programme. Former female supporters and the women married to LPRD fighters should be brought into the integration and disarmament process early, ideally in the initial organisation structures being worked up for the awareness component. Once appointed, they should seek female volunteers to support the LPRD integration and disarmament process by raising awareness and supporting training courses run by the LPRD with other stakeholders.

### Integration Project

Although there were no Thaat in the front line who carried weapons during the revolution, many did provide support. There is a need to integrate women into the civil police forces in order to deal with juvenile delinquents, female detainees in prisons and situations involving marital discourse in terms of providing help to families and children in such situations. Women are better equipped to deal with these segments both culturally and religiously and in terms of upbringing and guidance for the juveniles. In addition, international practice has proven that gender balanced security forces are more effective and that female officers can have a violence reducing impact when the police interferes. Studies conducted in for example the US have confirmed that female police officers use less excessive force, relying more on communication rather than physical force<sup>15</sup>. However, integrating women in security forces is quite a sensitive matter in the Libyan community and is not widely accepted, thus a quota of female former Thaat to be integrated into civil police forces needs to be lobbied for by LPRD among stakeholders.

### Disarmament Project

Women can make a great contribution towards this awareness as driving agents and key influencers for the weapons control process. Often times the motive behind men's reluctance to disarm, is a sense of need to protect their families. Mothers, wives, sisters and daughters can therefore encourage their male family members to disarm and push them towards a more civilian life style, by convincing them that they can be better protected without their men being armed. It is therefore recommended that women be included in the awareness training team.

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<sup>15</sup> Lonsway, K et al. 2002. *Men, women, and police excessive force: A tale of two genders*. National Center for Women & Policing, a division of the Feminist Majority Foundation.p.7

## 8. RESULTS FRAMEWORK INTEGRATION & DISARMAMENT PROGRAMME

<b>Integration Project</b> <b>Objective 1:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Select and negotiate training and placement of former Thuwar in Libya's new security forces.</li> <li>- Assist security sector stakeholders build and merge national databases related to former Thuwar. LPRD will transfer the MIS (Management of Information System) to State partners at the appropriate time.</li> </ul>			
<b>Outcome 1</b> Security and stability improved by the integration of 14,700 transparently selected, properly vetted, and professionally trained participants into the national security forces. Measured by national statistics on violent crimes, survey with population on the perception of new national security services. Indicator 1.1: National statistics on violent crimes. Indicator 1.2: Survey with population on the perception of new national security situation.			
<b>Outputs</b>  <b>Output 1. In collaboration with the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior, the LPRD establish selection criteria, vetting mechanisms, and develop relevant Standard Operating Procedures for the selection of eligible former Thuwar.</b>  <b>Output 2. Security forces capacity on management of information systems and databases developed.</b>  <b>Output 3. 14,700 former Thuwar are selected, vetted and trained for integration into the Libyan security forces.</b>	<b>Indicators</b>  Effective SOP developed.  Percentage of former Thuwars (among targeted 14.700) integrated in security forces.  Number of	<b>Activities</b>  Activity 1.1: LPRD will actively participate in the existing and future Government committees on Disarmament and on Integration.  Activity 1.2: Develop Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). Activity 1.3: Libyan Authorities endorse the Standard Operating Procedures, criteria and vetting mechanisms.  Activity 2.1: LPRD technically assists security sector stakeholders by developing their databases. Activity 2.2: Harmonize the security sector	<b>Assumptions</b>  Political will and national consensus is obtained.  Trust is built between all security sector stakeholders.  LPRD strategy is compatible with Government security sector strategy.  Security actors understand their role in Libyan RDD.  Funds & budgets are available on time.



<p><b>Output 4. 14,700 successfully selected candidates physically surrender their arms, are formally integrated into Libyan security forces and start receiving a salary.</b></p> <p><b>Output 5. Citizen perception on security forces is improved and Security Sector Reform initiated.</b></p>	<p>security forces staff qualified by LPRD.</p> <p>Survey on the image of security forces among citizens.</p>	<p>stakeholders' databases with the LPRD information system.</p> <p>Activity 3.1: Based on the updated database, prepare a list of potential candidates for integration.</p> <p>Activity 3.2: Establish a joint selection and vetting committee.</p> <p>Activity 3.3: Screen candidates against selection criteria and vetting procedure.</p> <p>Activity 3.4: Share the list of 14,700 participants with the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior and initiate the official recruitment process for transfer to these Ministries.</p> <p>Activity 3.5: Adapt the curriculum for training of Former Thuwar to meet the needs of the trainees.</p> <p>Activity 3.6: Individuals attend one-day induction course. (Be prepared to implement Activity 4.2 here for some selected individuals).</p> <p>Activity 3.7: Hire relevant training capacities and initiate training.</p> <p>Activity 4.1: Prepare Standard Operating Procedures for physical weapon surrender for validation by the relevant Libyan authorities (responsibility of Disarmament Programme).</p> <p>Activity 4.2: Safely and securely collect, check register and store weapons.</p> <p>Activity 4.3: The selected candidates join their new units and start their duties.</p>	
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		<p>Activity 4.4: The Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence add the integrated former Thuwars to their respective payrolls.</p> <p>Activity 4.5: The Ministry of Defence integrates former Thuwar into the Joint Weapons Control Office and Logistic Units (for AMC graduates).</p> <p>Activity 5.1: LPRD launches the Security Sector Dialogue Initiative.</p> <p>Activity 5.2: LPRD contributes to and supports proposals on Security Sector Reform.</p> <p>Activity 5.3: Former Thuwars support Security forces to improve their image nationwide.</p>	
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### **Disarmament project**

**Objective 2:** Contribute to the Government of Libya's disarmament and weapons control processes, by focussing on disarmament of former Thuwar, applying the RDD approach and raising awareness in communities around Libya as to the importance of weapon control and disarmament.

**Outcome 2** **Efficient and trusted management of weapons, as a prelude to a national disarmament process, is achieved and the Libyan population is made aware on the importance of weapons control and disarmament.**

Indicator 2.1: Number of serviceable weapons registered by participants in the RDD programme.

Indicator 2.2: Number of weapons placed in local safe storage by armed groups.

Indicator 2.3: Number of serviceable weapons surrendered to national storage.

Indicator 2.3: National survey on the disarmament process.

<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Key activities</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
<b>Output 1. Population's perception of the security environment is improved by the LPRD awareness campaign.</b>	Data on and trends of the number of arms	Activity 1.1: LPRD actively lobbies the Parliament and National Government to support the LPRD arms control initiative.	Political will and national consensus.

<p><b>Output 2. LPRD has actively contributed to a Libyan national arms law and regulation and lobbied for its approval and enforcement.</b></p> <p><b>Output 3. LPRD is an active actor in developing national arms and weapons control capacity.</b></p> <p><b>Output 4. Local storage of weapons initiated.</b></p> <p><b>Output 5. National disarmament process is established.</b></p>	<p>related incidents.</p> <p>National arms law is submitted for consideration by Parliament.</p> <p>Number of trained armament specialists.</p> <p>Number of registered arms and weapons.</p> <p>Number of weapons stored at local (armed group) level.</p> <p>Number of weapons stored at national (MOD) level.</p>	<p>Activity 1.2: Develop and launch a national awareness media campaign.</p> <p>Activity 1.3: Involve civil society organisations in the awareness campaign.</p> <p>Activity 2.1: LPRD contributes to a national consensus among all security stakeholders.</p> <p>Activity 2.2: LPRD contributes to the preparation of a draft national arms law and regulation.</p> <p>Activity 3.1: LPRD actively seeks agreement with relevant Libyan stakeholders on protocols (such a weapons accounting protocols), processes and policies. In particular, LPRD develops the weapons control protocols, with a clear policy for non-compliance, for those LPRD participants who have or are about to be integrated in the Army or Police.</p> <p>Activity 3.2: LPRD assists in setting-up a Joint Weapons Control Office in the Ministry of Defence.</p> <p>Activity 3.3: LPRD assists, and where needed leads, in developing weapons registration and safe storage capacity for all relevant stakeholders.</p> <p>Activity 3.4: Select a number of former Thuwar from all over Libya to join the Ministry of Defence and train them on an</p>	<p>Inclusiveness.</p> <p>Unity of effort.</p> <p>Simultaneous and harmonized actions.</p> <p>National borders are effectively controlled.</p> <p>Sustainable level of funding.</p>
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		<p>Armoury Management Course.</p> <p>Activity 3.5: Organise disarmament of the new groups of LPRD participants who are either integrating into the military and police or going overseas on courses.</p> <p>Activity 3.6: Enrol the most talented former Thuwar into a Train the Trainers Armoury Management course where they will be further mentored and qualified.</p> <p>Activity 3.7: LPRD assists in establishing secure and updated databases in key partner organisations.</p> <p>Activity 4.1: Initiate safe and secure storage systems or facilities at the local level. (Options to include provision of ISO-storage, weapons accounting software, dual key storage systems etc).</p> <p>Activity 4.2: Continue the on-going LPRD-led dialogue with armed groups on the control of local storage of weapons.</p> <p>Activity 4.3: Where appropriate, implement a dual-key system for local storage of weapons.</p> <p>Activity 5.1: LPRD is a facilitator to physically disarm all it programme participants on entry to integration training or subsequent employment.</p> <p>Activity 5.2: Gradually handover of the LPRD</p>	
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		control systems and processes to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence.	
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## 9. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

### 9.1 STEPS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE NEXT 8 MONTHS

#### Integration Project

Month	M 1				M 2				M 3				M 4				M 5				M 6				M 7				M 8			
Week	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Continue LPRD facilitated dialogue between armed groups.																																
Establish a Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior and LPRD task force to consult stakeholders and to establish selection criteria and vetting mechanisms.																																
Develop SOPs.																																
Libyan Authorities endorse the SOPs, criteria and vetting mechanisms.																																
LPRD technically assists security sector stakeholders by developing their databases.																																
Harmonize the security sector stakeholders’ databases with the LPRD information system.																																
Based on the updated database, prepare a list of potential candidates for integration.																																
Establish a joint selection and vetting committee.																																



## Disarmament Project

Month	M 1				M 2				M 3				M 4				M 5				M 6				M 7				M 8			
Week	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Continue the on-going LPRD-led dialogue with armed groups on local storage of weapons.																																
LPRD actively lobbies the Parliament and National Government to support the LPRD arms control initiative.																																
LPRD contributes to a national consensus among all security stakeholders.																																
Select a number of former Thuwar leaders from all over Libya to join the Ministry of Defence and train them on an Armoury Management Course.																																
LPRD assists in setting-up a Joint Weapons Control Office in the Ministry of Defence.																																
LPRD develops the weapons control protocols, with a clear policy for non-compliance, for those LPRD participants who have or are about to be integrated in the Army or Police or travel abroad																																
Assess and negotiate best approach for setting-up a dual-key system for local storage of weapons.																																



## 9.2 BROAD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS

### Integration Project

Year	2014				2015				2016				2017			
Activity 1.1: Establish a Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior and LPRD task force to consult stakeholders and to establish selection criteria and vetting mechanisms.																
Activity 1.2: Develop SOPs.																
Activity 1.3: The Libyan Authorities endorse the Standard Operating Procedures, criteria and vetting mechanisms.																
Activity 2.1: LPRD technically assists security sector stakeholders by developing their databases.																
Activity 2.2: Harmonize the security sector stakeholders' databases with the LPRD information system.																
Activity 3.1: Based on the updated database, prepare a list of potential candidates for integration.																
Activity 3.2: Establish a joint selection and vetting committee.																
Activity 3.3: Screen candidates against selection criteria and vetting procedure.																
Activity 3.4: Share the list of 14,700 participants with the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior and initiate the official recruitment process for transfer to these																

Ministries.																	
Activity 3.5: Adapt the curriculum for training of Former Thuwar to meet the needs of the trainees.																	
Activity 3.6: Individuals attend one-day induction course. (Be prepared to implement Activity 4.2 here for some selected individuals)																	
Activity 3.7: Hire relevant training capacities and initiate training.																	
Activity 4.1: Prepare Standard Operating Procedures for physical weapon surrender for validation by the relevant Libyan authorities. (Responsibility of Disarmament Programme).																	
Activity 4.2: Safely and securely collect, check register and store weapons.																	
Activity 4.3: The selected candidates join their new units and start their duties.																	
Activity 4.4: The Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence add the integrated former Thuwars to their respective payrolls.																	
Activity 4.5: The Ministry of Defence integrates former Thuwar into the Joint Weapons Control Office and Logistic Units (for AMC graduates).																	
Activity 5.1: LPRD launches the Security Sector Dialogue Initiative.																	

Activity 5.2: LPRD contributes to and supports a proposal on Security Sector Reform.																
Activity 5.3: Former Thuwar support Security forces to improve their image nationwide.																

## Disarmament Project

Year	2014				2015				2016				2017			
Activity 1.1: LPRD actively lobbies the Parliament and National Government to support the LPRD arms control initiative.																
Activity 1.2: Launch a national awareness media campaign.																
Activity 1.3: Involve civil society organisations in the awareness campaign.																
Activity 2.1: LPRD contributes to a national consensus among all security stakeholders.																
Activity 2.2: LPRD contributes to the preparation of a draft national arms law and regulation.																
Activity 2.3: LPRD assists in setting-up a Joint Weapons Control Office in the Ministry of Defence.																
Activity 3.1: LPRD actively seeks agreement with relevant Libyan stakeholders on protocols (such a weapons accounting protocols), processes and policies. In particular, LPRD develops the weapons control protocols, with a clear policy for non-compliance, for those LPRD participants who have or are about to be integrated in the Army or Police.																
Activity 3.2: LPRD assists, and where needed leads, in developing weapons registration and safe storage capacity for all relevant stakeholders.																

Activity 3.3: Select a number of former Thuwar leaders from all over Libya to join the Ministry of Defence and train them on an Armoury Management Course.																
Activity 3.4: Organise disarmament of the new groups of LPRD participants who are either integrating into the military and police or going overseas on courses.																
Activity 3.5: Enrol the most talented former Thuwar leaders into a Training of Trainers Armament Management course where they will be further mentored and qualified.																
Activity 3.6: LPRD assists in establishing secure and updated databases in key partner organisations.																
Activity 4.1: Initiate safe and secure storage facilities at local level.																
Activity 4.2: Continue the on-going LPRD-led dialogue with armed groups on local storage of weapons.																
Activity 4.3: Assess best approach for setting-up a dual-key system for local storage of weapons.																
Activity 5.1: LPRD is a facilitator to disarm all its programme participants.																
Activity 5.2: Gradually handover of the LPRD controls and processes to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence.																

### 9.3 STAFFING REQUIREMENTS AND ORGANOGRAMME OF I&D PROGRAMME

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The staffing requirements of the Disarmament project will be determined at a later stage. It will require the following staff as a minimum, answerable to the Disarmament Project Manager: 1) Head, JWCO; 2) Operations Officer; 3) Deputy Operations Officer; 4) MIS x 3; 5) Technical Officers/Negotiators x 4; and 6) Administrative Staff (TBC).

